The most pressing geopolitical challenge of the 21st century is China’s growing military, economic and technological capabilities, shifting the attention of the powers to the Indo-Pacific region. The information in recent weeks is focusing attention on the growing tensions between China and Taiwan and the possibility that Beijing could invade the island. This possibility is explained by several reasons: from the Chinese determination that Taiwan is part of its territory; that Taiwan crosses the red lines for Beijing, that is, that the pro-independence faction gains strength; or the semiconductor shortage crisis. But you only have to look at the map to see that Taiwan forms a kind of plug in front of China’s maritime outlet. From there, China’s line of moves can be established,

On the one hand, we find a series of Chinese actions that have been taking place in recent weeks and that are increasing the fear of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, but, on the other hand, it is very necessary to consider Beijing’s movements as long-term strategies. , also assessing how the Silk Road and its consequences have been developed, and the formation of the so-called “pearl necklace”. China has not only been projecting its future for decades; it intends to be where it had always been until the middle of the 19th century: being the first economic power in the world.

Likewise, other elements that come into play must also be taken into consideration in this geopolitical challenge, such as: the economic and technological war between China and the United States, the formation of the AUKUS, the energy transition from fossil fuels to renewable energies, and the growing Chinese military capacity with its military logistics problems to carry out a sustained conflict over time.

The information that grabs the most headlines and is paid the most attention by analysts is that relations between China and Taiwan have fallen to their lowest point in four decades. Taiwan feels that it constantly lives under the threat of invasion by China, which considers the island as part of its territory and believes that it can take it by force if it sees fit. As actions across the Taiwan Strait have increased, it is the prospect of an attack by Beijing on the island that worries analysts. They fear that any miscalculation could lead to a deeper crisis that could end in the real possibility of a large-scale attack. Although the cost of a Chinese maneuver of this type is now expensive, the belief of the experts is that from 2025 these costs could be reduced, since China would have the capacity to launch a large-scale invasion. Meanwhile, what Beijing is doing is increasing its military, diplomatic and economic pressure^[1] .

Although China has formally declared that it has no intention of invading Taiwan, it is the latest Chinese military maneuvers that have triggered suspicions that a military conflict may break out. This could be justified by Chinese nationalist impetus or by its desire to exert pressure on the United States. (Don’t forget that China also has territorial claims against the Philippines, Japan, Vietnam, and India.) The Chinese military activities of the last few days putting pressure on Taiwan could be the first piece of a domino that seeks to achieve regional and world dominance, so if Taiwan falls it would not be the end but the beginning of the game ^[2] .

But for Taiwan these military exercises, which include the overflight of Chinese military aircraft, including nuclear-capable bombers and a refueling variant of the Y-20, over its ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone) has raised concerns about a invasion of their territory ^[3]. The overflight of these more than 150 Chinese planes in the island’s air defense zone has also been criticized by the United States. Added to this is China’s criticism of the presence of the American destroyer USS Milius through the Taiwan Strait, which, for Beijing, is a risk to regional security and stability. The explanation offered by the United States is that the Milius was engaged in routine transit activity through the strait, thus demonstrating the US commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific and the right to navigate and operate where international law permits. ^[4] . In other words, it is limited to FONOPS operations to guarantee freedom of navigation in international waters ^[5] .

On Sunday, November 28, five Chinese army warplanes entered the southeast of the island ^[6] . The presence of the Y-20 variant refueling aircraft could mean that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army has begun to prepare for a broader military maneuver around the Taiwan Strait ^[7] . That is, China could be preparing to engage foreign intervention forces and drive them away or destroy them on the spot if necessary ^.[8]. This exercise also coincided on the same day that a Lithuanian parliamentary delegation arrived on the island and shortly after a US Congressional delegation visited Taipei on Friday, November 26. For Beijing, these kinds of exercises are routine, but they send a warning to Taiwan secessionists and foreign intervention forces.

Any attempt by Taiwan to declare its independence would mean crossing red lines with Beijing and could trigger a forceful response from China. On November 23, Taiwan’s legislative authorities approved an additional budget worth 8.63 billion dollars for the island’s navy and air force in order to counter China’s military modernization and increasingly aggressive behavior. The expense would be spread over five years, covering the acquisition of eight weapon systems ^[9] . The Taiwanese military intends to use these weapon systems for the purpose of resisting any attempt to forcibly unify China and also thwart the objective of the Chinese military’s amphibious landing craft.

Currently, the cost of such an invasion would disrupt Xi Jinping’s plans to remain in power, weaken China’s current global position, which would have to endure sanctions and embargoes from the international community, and could lead to a confrontation with the United States. States and other powers. These Chinese military maneuvers seem to place the country in a pre-war state. The immediate consequences of this type of activity is that it prepares its population for a possible confrontation and, above all, it prepares its armed forces for it and for any military contingency ^[10]. History shows that these types of maneuvers should not be treated only as simple military exercises but should also be interpreted as a preparation for war, despite the difficulties generated in the work of intelligence agencies to distinguish between simple military exercises and maneuvers in preparation for a war. It is enough to remember how the Yom Kippur War of 1973 was conceived. Despite the concern of a conflict in the making, it must always be borne in mind that Chinese strategies opt for the long term. China thinks in “generations” not in electoral deadlines and not estimating this way of thinking could err the analyzes of the experts.

The US position regarding China-Taiwan tensions has been maintained for decades in a “strategic ambiguity” whereby Washington commits to building Taiwan’s self-defense but does not promise an explicit intervention ^[11] . This is established by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which ambiguously states that the United States government would consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by non-peaceful means, including boycotts or embargoes ^[12] .

Given the progress of Chinese military development, Washington is also emphasizing the idea of ​​reinforcing its bases in Guam and Australia to better position itself against China, prioritizing military construction in the Pacific Islands. The recent signing of the defense pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS) is part of these efforts to counter China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific region.

But China’s strategic sights are long-term. It distinguishes a series of military development objectives until the year 2030. Its current military capabilities can support the objectives of having the capacity to contribute to joint operations, which for China are perceived as the responsibility of a great power, such as missions in the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden, and the defense of its economic interests abroad, especially those derived from the Silk Road Initiative. The goal of imposing unacceptable costs for access or free maneuvering within the first and second island chains, which include the South and East China Seas as well as the waters up to Guam, is more difficult to achieve until 2030 ^{[13 ]} .

Both the Chinese Navy and Air Force are rapidly expanding their offensive and logistical capabilities but are still in the development phase and have not developed the doctrine or experience necessary to maximize the use of these capabilities. The main supply capabilities reside in the Type 903A and Type 901 Fast Support Ships, designed to support carrier groups. This auxiliary fleet is capable of giving logistics support to some twenty to thirty surface combatants for two to three weeks without resupply. To overcome this period of time at present, the supply has to come from foreign civilian posts or national ships. Regarding air operations, China has limited ability to project air power beyond limited amphibious operations, at least through 2030. Although the Y-20 expands the air force’s expeditionary capability, the lack of overseas air bases means China has to rely on civilian airports, at least in the short term. Despite these limitations, China is rapidly developing the capabilities necessary to disrupt US interests in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.

It is at this point that attention must be paid to the “old” initiatives of the Silk Road and the “pearl necklace strategy” and to the Chinese vision of ensuring its long-term strategies, being aware of the logistical problem that it has despite its high military capabilities. According to the “pearl necklace theory”, the construction of commercial port infrastructure could serve as a cover for China to build depots or ammunition. Trade ties with host countries could hide secret agreements that would give the Chinese People’s Army access to facilities in the event of a conflict, thereby allowing provisioning. That is, foreign trade facilities overseas could be used as nodes in its military logistics network.

In the same way, Chinese infrastructure projects in the countries that make up the terrestrial Silk Road, financed through loans with unsustainable interest rates for the host countries, may cause many of them, at risk of default, to adopt agreements leasing as is the case in Sri Lanka. These countries thus become future foreign military bases for China in the event of a future conflict.

The commercial relations that China has been establishing for years help it to project an image of a great power, to bring certain countries closer to its area of ​​influence, thus using this economic influence and the so-called soft power to forge a sphere of influence in the region that connects China with Central Asia, the Caspian Sea basin and Europe. The sea route also allows it to control strategic waterways, expanding its dominance in the strategic area and positioning itself as the greatest challenge in the Indo-Pacific region. But for the Chinese economy one of the biggest threats is the bankruptcy of the real estate giant Evergrande and the consequences for its banking system and the possible contagion effect on the Chinese economy in general ^[14] .

Regarding nuclearization, the Chinese military has accelerated the pace of its nuclear expansion program to the point where it could have up to 700 nuclear warheads by 2030, according to the US Department of Defense report on military and security developments. of the People’s Republic of China, presented in November 2021 ^[15]. China is rapidly developing its capabilities in emerging defense technologies including: autonomous and unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, hypersonic weapons, and directed energy weapons. These capabilities would allow you to deter the adversary or impose significant costs. In fact, information about a possible new Chinese hypersonic weapon has been received as alarming by analysts, who claim that we are witnessing a new arms race. But the truth is that the Chinese position in the sector of strategic technologies could surpass the United States in critical areas such as quantum computing, artificial intelligence or genomics, and could tip the balance towards a Chinese vision of the regional order in the Indus -Peaceful.

The position of predominance that China is acquiring originates a situation of tension conceptualized as an economic and technological war that pits it against the United States. For Beijing, energy security and technological security are an intrinsic part of its national security. But not all countries are concerned with how technology can affect the balance of power or how it can make them economically dependent on technological powerhouses. It is a necessity for States to look for vulnerabilities in critical technological sectors. China has indeed understood. Along with the increase in tensions with Taiwan, China’s mistrust of the Taiwanese semiconductor industry is also exposed as a substantive argument. Taiwan’s dominant role in the global chip industry is causing countries to consider where they stand in a conflict with China. If Beijing takes control of Taiwan, it will take control of most of the world’s production of chips that are used not only in mobile phones, computers or cars, but also in planes, warships, submarines or missiles. . In other words, it would take over the power to supply or de-supply as it pleased.

In the face of the semiconductor supply crisis, States have taken various initiatives. China is investing in semiconductor manufacturing and technological innovation. The United States is bringing chip production closer to home. But correcting the flaws in the chip supply chain by bringing production closer together causes a loss of speed in the process, thus affecting markets and consumers ^[16]. The approach of this semiconductor production has geopolitical implications, since concentrating its production in Taiwan is risky. The United States has realized the danger to its security of having outsourced chip production, despite leading chip design. Each step in the manufacture and supply of semiconductors involves an access point that can be used maliciously to compromise their technology or to study and copy it ^[17] .

Following China’s long-term strategies, we must also examine the energy transition from a model based on fossil fuels to a model based on renewable energies and its geopolitical implications. Competition between great powers is going to accelerate the evolution of this energy transition. And China’s energy situation is complex. Its energy security has become an important strategy for national economic development. The main challenge it faces is its high level of external dependence on oil and gas. Therefore, to guarantee its energy security, China is going to take a step forward in technology and science, which is under the protection of its concept of national security. Its goal is to achieve national energy self-sufficiency. With that,

In 1987, then Chinese President Deng Xiaoping said: “The Middle East has oil. China has rare earths” ^[18] . Currently, the so-called rare earth industry in China is so important that in 2019 it was responsible for 80% of imports of these rare earths, according to the US Geological Survey ^[19].. It also has at least 85% of the world’s capacity to process rare earth minerals. One of the elements mined from these lands is thorium, a weakly radioactive silvery metal that makes it a very attractive alternative to imported uranium. Thorium is much more abundant than uranium and generates less radioactive waste, so it will be very useful in fifty or a hundred years, when uranium becomes scarce. China, aware of this, has a nuclear energy project underway in Wuwei (on the outskirts of the Gobi desert) that uses this element as fuel. If the experimental nuclear reactor is successful, China will have the possibility to commercialize this technology and achieve its climate goals ^[20]. In the meantime, it remains dependent on coal power in the short term. And although it continues to lead the construction of coal-fired power plants, many of them in the countries that are part of the Silk Road Initiative, the country’s fourteenth five-year plan is one of the most important documents regarding the effort against climate change. climate, since it establishes the guidelines to place China on the path towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) and compliance with the Paris Agreement.

Also aware that one of its greatest challenges is its confrontation with the United States over the issue of the South China Sea and energy transport corridors, which hinders its energy and commercial transport routes, China is weighing the implications that a strategic agreement with Iran, if its application is feasible and what its impact would be on its relations with Saudi Arabia and Israel. Given the US intervention in the South China Sea dispute (with the Chinese declaration of sovereignty considered illegal), it is expected that this energy transport route could be sabotaged against Chinese interest. Given this, China could promote a land corridor for transporting oil and gas from Iran to Xinjiang. On the other hand, It also bears in mind that the development of renewable energies is what is going to shape the global strategic landscape (since it would provide it with greater energy security) and that it is necessary to invest in these technologies. In this context, the cooperation of the Russian and Chinese governments in military and energy matters is inscribed. Regarding military cooperation, both countries signed a roadmap to strengthen ties, indicating that both have common interests in the Pacific region. Trade in the energy sector has grown at a rapid pace, with energy accounting for nearly a third of bilateral trade in the first three quarters of 2021 In this context, the cooperation of the Russian and Chinese governments in military and energy matters is inscribed. Regarding military cooperation, both countries signed a roadmap to strengthen ties, indicating that both have common interests in the Pacific region. Trade in the energy sector has grown at a rapid pace, with energy accounting for nearly a third of bilateral trade in the first three quarters of 2021 In this context, the cooperation of the Russian and Chinese governments in military and energy matters is inscribed. Regarding military cooperation, both countries signed a roadmap to strengthen ties, indicating that both have common interests in the Pacific region. Trade in the energy sector has grown at a rapid pace, with energy accounting for nearly a third of bilateral trade in the first three quarters of 2021^[21] .

Going back to the question that seems to worry analysts in recent weeks, it cannot be confirmed whether China will use force to annex Taiwan, although they fear that this threat could become a reality in the next six years. Conflicts are preceded by explicit declarations of intentions to use force if necessary, together with an increase in military capabilities. And China, in addition to expressing its desire to reunify with Taiwan, is demonstrating increasingly aggressive behavior in the region, countered by various initiatives by the United States, which openly shows its support in guaranteeing Taiwan’s security.^[22] .

The Chinese pressure of recent weeks towards Taiwan must not divert attention from what is really important: its long-term strategies to position itself as a hegemonic power using diplomacy and soft power, its investment in technologies, its priority in the energy transition, and the consequences of the commercial and economic investments of the terrestrial and maritime Silk Road. China’s purposes for the year 2035 are innovation-driven growth and technological competition to develop the domestic consumer market and promote the Silk Road Initiative, integrate Asia, advance cooperation with Europe and establish a network of infrastructures that cover the planet and restructure globalization towards a new geopolitical order.

^[1] At the same time that China has waged its pressure campaign to subdue Taipei, its diplomacy has also lashed out at other states that have hosted meetings with Taiwanese officials. Beijing is not shaking its hand when issuing warnings to Australia after its Minister of Defense stated that it was impossible for his country not to join the United States in defending the island. See Sevastopulo, D. (November 13, 2021), “Australia vows to help US defend Taiwan from Chinese attacks”, Financial Times , https://www.ft.com/content/231df882-6667-4145-bc92-d1a54bccf333

He likewise lashed out at Lithuania after a Taiwanese diplomatic office was established in its capital, Vilnius. Lithuania also faces problems due to Russian and Belarusian pressure on migrants at its border with Belarus.

Among these diplomatic actions, we must also consider the countries that are recently joining the Chinese orbit, such as Nicaragua or the Solomon Islands, with the intention of diplomatically isolating Taiwan.

^[2] Feng, J. (November 19, 2021), “Taiwan Could Be First Domino in Chinese Land Grab Across Asia”, Newsweek , https://www.newsweek.com/if-china-invaded-taiwan-would -it-stop-there-1651051

^[3] Taiwan’s Defense Air Identification Zone is different from its territorial airspace and also includes a larger area that overlaps with part of the Chinese ADIZ and even includes a part of Mainland China.

^[4] “US again sends warship through Taiwan Strait”, (November 23, 2021), South China Morning , https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3157040/us-again-sends -warship-through-taiwan-strait

^[5] See “Freedom of Navigation Report Annual Release”, (March 16, 2021), Office of the Spokesperson, US Department of State, https://www.state.gov/freedom-of-navigation-report-annual -release/#:~:text=DoD’s%20operational%20challenges%2C%20also%20known,guaranteed%20in%20international%20law%20as

^[6] A total of twenty-seven Chinese PLA aircraft, including two KJ-500 early warning aircraft, one Y-9 electronic warfare aircraft, five H-6 bombers, one Y-20 aerial refueling aircraft, six J-10 fighter jets, four J-11 fighter jets, and eight J-16 fighter jets entered the Air Defense Identification Zone in southeastern Taiwan on November 28. See Xuanzun, L. & Wei, F. (November 29, 2021), “Aerial refueling variant of Y-20 debuts near the Taiwan Straits, ‘to amplify PLA’s air superiority’”, Global Times , https://www. globaltimes.cn/page/202111/1240149.shtml

^[7] “Y-20 variant symbolizes new devt in Taiwan Straits: Global Times editorial” (November 30, 2021), Global Times , https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202111/1240241.shtml

^[8] Southeast Taiwan is one of the directions from which US troops could enter if Washington decides to intervene in a war in the Taiwan Strait. This means that this Chinese military exercise is aimed at attacking targets in the eastern part of the island and crushing US forces that might come to the rescue of Taiwan)

^[9] These weapon systems are shore-based anti-ship missiles, anti-aircraft missiles, long-range precision missiles, Navy and Coast Guard ships, drones, Han Chien air-to-surface cruise missiles, and Hsiung missiles. Sheng, produced in Taiwan.

^[10] A display of Chinese military power was the passage through the Taiwan Strait on November 29 of a Chinese Navy submarine, provisionally identified as a Type-094 Jin-class SSBN, passing on the surface escorted by another ship. See “OSINT: Chinese Navy Type-094 Jin SSBN in Taiwan Strait”, Covert Shores , http://www.hisutton.com/Chinese-Navy-Type-094-Submarine-OSINT.html

^[11] On August 4, 2021, the United States announced a $750 million arms sale to Taiwan, including 40 M109A6 155mm medium self-propelled howitzer systems arriving in 2023. See Chen, K (August 6, 2021), “China urges US to observe ‘one China’ principle following Taiwan arms deal”, Taiwan News ,  https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4265188

^[12] This law requires the President to work with Congress on how to respond to any threat to Taiwan and to US interests in the Western Pacific area. This procedure makes the US strategy for such a conflict politically and militarily flawed. See Taiwan Relations Act, https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479

^[13] Peltier, CH., (2020). China’s Logistics Capabilities for Expeditionary Operations, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/China%20Expeditionary%20Logistics%20Capabilities%20Report.pdf

^[14] The real estate sector accounts for around 30% of China’s GDP. Around 41% of the assets of its banking system are directly or indirectly associated with this sector and 78% of the Chinese’s invested wealth is in real estate. In addition, China is the largest consumer of many raw materials. See Charles, A., Bracken, K. (September 21, 2021), “What is the Evergrande debt crisis and why does it matter for the global economy?”, World Economic Forum , https://www.weforum.org /agenda/2021/09/evergrande-debt-crisis-global-economy/

^[15] “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021”. Annual Report to Congress. Office of Secretary of Defense, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF

^[16] In June 2021, the United States Congress passed the United States Competition and Innovation Act authorizing $110 billion for basic and advanced technological research, commercialization and education programs, and training in artificial intelligence, semiconductors, computing quantum, advanced communications, biotechnology and advanced energy, for a period of five years.

^[17] The South Korean firm Samsung plans to build a $17 billion plant in Taylor, Texas, to make advanced chips. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing (TSCM) has broken ground on its $12 billion plant in Arizona, which will go into production in 2024. For its part, Intel announced in March that it would invest $20 billion in two new manufacturing plants in Arizona. . In this way, the objective of promoting the manufacture of chips in the country would be fulfilled. See Wong, J. (November 23, 2021), “Samsung Orders US Chips, With a Side of Geopolitics”, The Wall Street Journal , https://www.wsj.com/articles/samsung-orders-us-chips -with-a-side-of-geopolitics-11637666262

^[18] Magnuson, S. (September 8, 2021), “China Maintains Dominance in Rare Earth Production”, National Defense NDIA’s Business & Technology Magazine , https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/9/8 /china-maintains-dominance-in-rare-earth-production

^[19] See https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2020/mcs2020-rare-earths.pdf

^[20] Mallapaty, S. (September 9, 2021), “China prepares to test thorium-fueled nuclear reactor”, Nature , https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-02459-w

^[21] Daye, Ch, (November 29, 2021), “China-Russia energy cooperation accelerating”, Global Times , https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202111/1240225.shtml

^[22] “China’s National Defense in the New Era”, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/ 2019-07/24/content_4846452.htm